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s.c. No. 37236-2009
Custer County Case No. CR-2007-S0

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC.
Plaintiff / Respondent
vs.

FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C.
Defendant / Appellant

SUPPLEMENTAL CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, ill and for the Coullty of Custer;.
Before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge

Curt R. Thomsen, Esq.
P.O. Box 600
Challis, ID 83226
Attorney for PlaintijjlRespondent
Cynthia J. Woolley, Esq.
P.O. Box 6999
Ketchum, ID 83340
Attorneyfor Defendant/Appellant
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Case No. CV-07-0050
Plaintiff!cQunterdefendarit,
vs.
FL YING JOSEPH RANCH, LLC, An Idaho
limited liability company; J.C.
INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation,

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO CLERK'S
RECORD

Defendants/counterclaimants.

Currently before the Court is Defendant's objection to the clerk's record on appeal. In
Defendant's notice of appeal, Defendant requested that the clerk's record contain the documents
"automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R." and "all requested and given jury instructions."
This Court finds that a hearing on the objection is not necessary and in the interests of judicial
economy and expediency rules as follows.
In considering Defendant's objection, the Court refers to Rule 28 and the documents

which are automatically included in a standard clerk's record. Defendant asserts that the record
is missing "all briefs on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss". However, briefs are not included in a
standard record and were not requested in the notice of appeal. This objection is overruled.
Defendant objects that the record is missing the "Decision on Second Motion to
Dismiss". Court rulings should be included in the standard record and to the extent the record is
missing the referenced decision, the decision is to be included in the record. This objection is
sustained.
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Defendant objectsthat the record does not contain an affidavit in support of defendants'

were not requested in the notice of appeal. See Ru1e 28(a), LA.R. This objection is overruled,
Defendant objects that the record does not contain all summary judgment briefs. Briefs
were not requested and are not part of the standard record. This objection is overruled.
Defendant objects that the page between pages 69 and 71 is not numbered as is the page
between pages 72 and 74. Pages in the clerk's record should be numbered and this objection is
sustained.
Defendant objects that the signature page of a "StipUlation to Vacate and Re-set Trial
Date" dated October 9, 2008, is missing. Stipu1ations were not requested in the notice of appeal
and are not part of a standard record. This objection is overruled.
Defendant objects that the record does not contain Defendant's proposed jury
instructions. In the notice of appeal Defendant specifically requested all requested and given jury
instructions and therefore, all proposed jury instructions should be included in the clerk's record.
This objection is sustained.
THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendant's objection to the clerk's record is
sustained in part and overru1ed in part. The Clerk should include in the clerk's record on appeal
the documents for which the objection was sustained. The hearing scheduled for October 20,
2010 is vacated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

"C:0 day of September, 2010.

ORDER ON OBJECTION - 2

~U/LU/LUIU/NIUN u~:n

f. UU4

ANI

I hereby certify that on this dO day of September, 2010, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon.

curt R. Thomsen
P.O. Box 600
Challis, ID 83226
Cynthia J. Woolley
P.O. Box 6999
Ketchum, ID 83340

BARBARA TIERNEY
Clerk of the District Court
Custer County, Idaho

BY~~_
Deputy
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Case: CV-2007-0000050 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey
Pines Grazing Association vs. Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc, etal.

Pines Grazing Association vs. Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc, J.C. Investments
Date

Code

User

6/412009

NOTC

RUTH

Notice of Telephonic Hearing for Pre-Trial
Conference

Joel E Tingey

6/18/2009

HRHD

RUTH

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
06/17/200902:30 PM: Hearing Held WoolleyTelephonically

Joel E Tingey

6/23/2009

CMIN

RUTH

Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference
Hearing date: 6/1712009 Time: 2:30 pm

Joel E Tingey

MINE

RUTH

Minute Entry

Joel E Tingey

MEMO

LAlLA

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second
Motion to Dismiss

Joel E Tingey

NOHR

LAlLA

Notice Of Hearing

Joel E Tingey

HRSC

LAlLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
07/22/2009 09:00 AM) Defendant's Second
Motion to Disimiss

Joel E Tingey

OBJC

RUTH

Plaintiff's Reply and Objection to Defendants'
Second Motion to Dismiss

Joel E Tingey

RUTH

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
07/22/200909:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss

Joel E Tingey

JRYI

RUTH

Plaintiff's Requested Jury Instructions and Verdict Joel E Tingey
Form

EXHI

RUTH

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-17

Joel E Tingey

WITN

RUTH

Defendants/Counterciaimants' Witness List

Joel E Tingey

EXHI

RUTH

Defendants/Counterciaimants' Trial Exhibit List

Joel E Tingey

JRYI

RUTH

Defendants/Counterciaimants' Proposed Jury
Instructions

Joel E Tingey

CMIN

RUTH

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Jury Trial
Hearing date: 7/22/2009 Time: 10:11 am
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Brunker

Joel E Tingey

MISC

RUTH

Excused Jurors List

Joel E Tingey

HRHD

RUTH

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/22/2009
09:30 AM: Hearing Held

Joel E Tingey

VERD

RUTH

Special Verdict Form

Joel E Tingey

JRYI

RUTH

Jury Instructions

Joel E Tingey

JDMT

RUTH

Judgment Upon Verdict

Joel E Tingey

STAT

RUTH

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Joel E Tingey

CDIS

RUTH

Civil Disposition entered for: Pines Grazing
Joel E Tingey
Association" Plaintiff; J.C. Investments"
Defendant; Flying Joseph Ranch, Llc" Defendant.
Filing date: 7/2712009

HRSC

RUTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/19/200902:30
PM) Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys Fees, Cost
and Prejudgment Interest

7/8i2009

7/13/2009

7/15/2009

7/16/2009

7/22/2009

7/24/2009

7/27/2009

7/29/2009

RF.hTSTF.R OF ACTIONS

Judge
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Joel E Tingey
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CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, ISB #6018
cynthia@ketchumidaholaw.com
LA W OFFICES OF CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, PLLC
P.O. BOX 6999
180 First St. West, Suite 107
Ketchum, ID 83340
(208) 725-5356
Fax: (208) 725-5569
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

PINES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
An Idaho Corporation, acting through its
statutory trustees,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,

Case No.: CV-2007 - 50

DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C., An
Idaho Limited Liability company;
J.C. INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation
or other entity.
Defendants/Counterclaiman ts.

COME NOW the Defendants/Counterc1aimants, Flying Joseph Ranch, L.L.c. and J.e.
Investments, by and through their attorney, Cynthia J. Woolley, of The Law Offices of Cynthia
J. Woolley, PLLC, and hereby submit their proposed jury instructions.

DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -

7/15/2009 5:25

P~

vROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) S79-e
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DATED this 15th day of July, 2009.
LA W OFFICES OF CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY, PLLC

CYNTHIA J. WOOLLEY
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTIONS·

7/15/2009 5:25
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Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-6'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 15,2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document upon the attorney(s) named below in the manner noted:
Curt R. Thomsen
. .
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC ( ) U.S. MaIL; Postage PrepaId
P.O. Box 600
( ) Hand ~eliver~d
Challis, ID 83226
( ) Over~ll~ht MaIL
Fax (208) 879-6672
(X) Facs~mIle
( ) E-maIL

LAW OFFICES OF CYNTHIA J. WOOLLEY, PLLC

CYNTHIA 1. WOOLLEY
Attorney for Defendants/Counterclaimants

DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -

7/15/2009 5:25

P~

~ROM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (20B)

879-~'

PAGE: 005 OF 061

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

Case No.: CV-2007 - 50

PlNES GRAZING ASSOCIATION, INC.,

An Idaho Cozporation, acting through its
statutory trustees,
SPECIAL VERDICT

PlaintlfflCounterdefendant,

vs.
FLYING JOSEPH RANCH, L.L.C., An

Idaho Limited Liability company;
J.e.INVESTMENTS, a foreign Corporation
or other entity.
Defendants/Counterclaimants

We the jury, duly empanelled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, answer the
questions submitted to us in this verdict as follows:
Question No.1

Was the alleged agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants entered into for a
lawful purpose?
MARKONLYONEOFTBEFOLLOWINGVERDICTS

ANSWER:

NO_ _ __

YES_ __

....................,...& ...

~

------

-

7{15{2009 5:25 PM

vROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-6'
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Question No.2

Did the Plaintiff, Pines Grazing Association, Inc, provide valid consideration to the
Defendants for the contract Plaintiff seeks to enforce?
YES_ __

ANSWER:

NO_ __

Question No.3

Was there mutual agreement by the Plaintiff and the Defendants regarding all essential
terms of the alleged contract?
YES_ __

ANSWER:

NO_ _ __

Question No.4

Did a valid contract exist between the Plaintiff and Defendant, Flying Joseph Ranch,
L.L.C.?
ANSWER:

YES

NO_ __

IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 4, ANSWER QUESTION NO.5
Question No.5

Did the Defendant, Flying Joseph Ranch, L.L.C. breach the contract with the Plaintiff?
ANSWER:

YES

NO_ __
Question No.6

Did a valid contract exist between the Plaintiff and Defendant, J.C. Investments?
ANSWER:

YES_ __

NO_ _ __

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

~ROM:

Cynthia

J

Woolley
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IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 6, ANSWER QUESTION NO.7

Question No.7

Did the Defendant, J.C. Investments breach the contract with the Plaintiff?
ANSWER:

YES

NO

---Question No.8

Was the Plaintiff damaged as a result of the Defendant's breach of contract?
ANSWER:

YES

NO_ __

IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 8 ANSWER QUESTION NO.9
Question No.9

What is the amount of damages that Defendants should pay to the Plaintiff?

$_-----

nuestion No. 10

Did the Plaintiffbreaclt' a valid C<jntract with the Defendants?
ANSWER:

YES

N(j

----

IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION NO 10 ANSWER QUESTION NO. 11
Question No. 11

What is the amount of damages that Plaintiff should pay the Defendants?

$_-----

7(15(2009 5: 25

~ROM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 87
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DATED: July ---' 2009

Signature of presiding juror if verdict
is unanimous
OR if only five jurors agree, signature of those five jurors:

.., ....

~,.,

........... ,,------ .

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

~ROM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 87
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Section 1.00 - General Procedure

IDJI 1.00 - Introductory instruction to jury
INSTRUCTION NO.
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that
applies to this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set
forth in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case.
Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective assessment of the
evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the

case, and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider
these instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The
order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which they are
numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do
not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff,
and I will try to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted

in this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the
exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts. While
the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you understand the
evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an

7(15(2009 5:25 PM

~~OM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 8
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attorney's argument or remark has no basis in tbe evidence, you sbould
disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At
times during the trial, I sustained an objection to a question witbout permitting
the witness to answer it, or to an offered exhibit witbout receiving it into
evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my responsibility. You
must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a
question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have
shown. Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only
as it gives meaning to the answer.
{There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer
was given or the remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I
instructed that the answer or remark be stricken, or directed that you
disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In your
deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it
as though you had never heard it]
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in
the course of the trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what
evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it In so doing, you bring
with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives.

7(15/2009 5:25

VROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 8
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There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday
affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and
how much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use
in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the

same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case,

Comment:
This instruction is a revision of IDJI 100, to clarify the language and eliminate
unnecessary verbiage. It also supercedes and replaces IDJI 120 and 121.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

~ROM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (20B) B79-
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IDJI 1.01 - Deliberation procedures
INSTRUCTION NO.
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you
my instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits
that have been admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in the
course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is
not thereby diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must
keep your notes to yourself and not show them to other persons or
jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

7(15/2009 5:25 PM

-~OM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-
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IDJI 1.03 - Admonition to jury

INSTRUCTION NO.
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of

the attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit

anyone to discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the
.case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you must report
it to me promptly.

3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you

retire to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard

all of the testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that
applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or

gain a greater understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event

occurred.

Comment:
This instruction is an outline of the elements often stated to jurors at the beginning of
a trial. See, lRCP 47(n). It is perhaps preferable to use the elements of this instruction as a
guide for a more informal explanation to the jury of the necessary conduct expected of them,
including reasons and examples as appropriate.

7/15/2009 5: 25

~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-
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IDJI 1.03.1 - Admonition to jury - short form
INSTRUCTION NO.
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss
this case among yourselves or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion
as to the merits of the case, until after I fmally submit the case to you.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

-~OM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 87
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mll 1. 05 - Statement ofclaims not evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.
Any statement by me identifying a claim. of a party is not
evidence in this case. I have advised you of the claims of the parties
merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

-qQM:

Cynthia J Woolley
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IDJI 1.07 - Facts not in dispute
INSTRUCTIQN..~

The fQHowing facts

1.

afe not in dispute:

Defendant and Counterclahnantr1Ying Joseph Ranch, LLC is an Idaho

Limited Liability Company with its registered agent in Blaine County, State of Idaho.
2.

Defendant and Counterclaimant J.C. Investments, Inc. is a foreign

Corporation with its registered agent in King, County, State of Washington.
3.

Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Pines Grazing Association, Inc. ("Pines

Grazing") is a dissolved Idaho nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business
in Custer County, State ofIdaho.

4.

On April 15, 2005 Defendants purchased 3,832 acres of real

property known as Pines Ranch and paid Plaintiff three million, eight hundred and
thirty two thousand dollars ($3,832,000.00) for the real property known as Pines

Ranch.

5.

The Lemhi County Parcels, at issue in this case, consist of

approximately 80 acres and are an integral part of Pines Ranch and a major reason
why Defendants purchased Pines Ranch. Plaintiff assured Defendants that he could
acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi County. As it turned out,
Plaintiff was not able to acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi
County and the Lemhi County Parcels had to be sold at public auction.

6.

Plaintifflnever oWned the Lemhi County Parcels, consisting

of approximately 80 acres, which is the subject of this dispute.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

7.

FROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879

~
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Plaintiff was never and has never been a licensed real estate

broker in the State of Idaho.
8.

Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff $1000 per acre for the

Lemhi County Parcels based on the condition that the Plaintiff acquire the Lemhi
County Parcels directly from Lemhi County, which the Plaintiff never did.
9.

The Lemhi County Parcels we¢ always, owned by Lemhi

County, a fact neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants understood in April 2005 .
10.

The Lemhi County Parcels could never be sold directly to the

Plaintiff and had to be sold at public auction -- a fact, neither the Plaintiff nor the
Defendants understood when they agreed that Defendants would pay the Plaintiff
$1000 an acre for the Lemhi County Parcels.
II.

The Lemhi County Parcels were sold at public auction by

Lemhi County on August 22, 2005.
12.

Defendants sent Scott Kartennan to the public auction on

August 22, 2005 to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels on their behalf.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendants, through Kartennan, orally agreed

that Plaintiff would not bid on the Lemhi County Parcels at auction and that
Kartennan would bid on behalf of the Defendants for the Lemhi County Parcels.
14.

Plaintiff and Defendants never reduced their oral agreement

made at the public auction, that Plaintiff would not bid at the public auction,

t~

writing.

15.

Defendants acquired the Lemhi County Parcels at public

auction for $35,012.00.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

16.

-~OM:

Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 679-
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After the public auction, Defendants sent Plaintiff a release

and settlement agreement which was not accepted by the Plaintiff.
17.

This law suit is brought by the Plaintiff asking Defendants to

pay Plaintiff additional monies for the Lemhi County Parcels, which the Plaintiff
never )owned. Plaintiff is seeking the difference between what Defendants paid at
public auction ($35,012.00) and the $1000 an acre Defendants allegedly agreed to
pay the Plaintiff ($80,000.00).

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

wROM: Cynthia

J

woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-
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IDJI 1.09 - Quotient verdicts

INSTRUCTION NO.
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions
to another or decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin
or drawing of straws.

H money damages are to be awarded or

percentages of fauIt are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of
determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of
negligence.

7/15/2009 5:25

'~OM:

Cynthia u Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879
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IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court
INSTRUCTION NO._

If it

becomes necessary during your deliberations to

communicate with me, you may send a note signed by one or more of
you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any
means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how
the jury stands on any of the questions before you, numerically or
otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

7/15/2009 5: 25

VROM: Cynthia

J

Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879
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IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I
mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true
than not true.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

~ROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO; +1 (208) 879-66-
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IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.
When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by
clear and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is
highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden

than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than

not true.

7/15/2009 5:25

~ROM:

Cynthia J Woolley
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IDJI 1.22 - Deposition testimony
INSTRUCTION NO._
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition.

A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and
preserved in writing [and upon video tape]. This evidence is entitled to
the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the
witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although
there is a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will
not be available to you during your deliberations.

Comment:
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury.

7/15/2009 5: 2S

FROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 879-
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IDJlI.24.2 - Circumstantial evidence with definition
INSTRUCTION NO
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence
is evidence that directly proves a fact.

Circumstantial evidence is

evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or more facts
from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence as to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing
force as it may carry.

Comments;
Two alternatives are offered, one including a brief definition of the teml
"circumstantial" and one without. The committee felt that the essential point to the
instruction is that there is no difference in degree of proof required between direct and
circumstantial evidence, and that the definition of the tenn "circumstantial" is
cumbersome and unnecessary. The recommendation is to use the first alternative is the
usual case. However, if the lawyers would not be permitted to explain circumstantial
evidence by example within the context of the case during argument, it may be necessary
to request the second alternative.
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IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admitted for limited purpose
INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.

I called your attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind
you that whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you
must not consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited
purpose for which it was admitted.
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No evidence on presumed facts
Basic facts undisputed
-- GIVE 1.30.1 (Binding instruction)
No evidence on presumed fact
Disputed evidence on basic fact
-- GIVE 1.30.2
Some evidence on existence of presumed fact
Disputed evidence on existence of basic facts
-- GIVE 1.30.3
Any substantial evidence on non-existence of presumed fact;
presumption is rebutted and evaporates.
-- NO instructions in 1.30 area
Instruction 1.30.1
1.

Defendant and Counterclaimant Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC is an Idaho

Limited Liability Company with its registered agent in Blaine County, State ofIdaho.
2.

Defendant and Counterclaimant J .C. Investments, Inc. is a foreign

Corporation with its registered agent in King, County, State of Washington.
3.

Plaintiff and Counter-<iefendant Pines Grazing Association, Inc. ("Pines

Grazing") is a dissolved Idaho nonprofit corporation with its principal place of business
in Custer County, State of Idaho.
4.

On April 15, 2005 Defendants purchased 3,832 acres ofrea1

property known as Pines Ranch and paid Plaintiff three million, eight hundred and
thirty two thousand dollars ($3,832,000.00) for the real property known as Pines

Ranch.

S.

The Lemhi County Parcels, at issue in this case, consist of

approximately 80 acres and are an integral part of Pines Ranch and a major reason
why Defendants purchased Pines Ranch. Plaintiff assured Defendants that he could
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acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi County. As it turned out,
Plaintiff was not able to acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly from Lemhi
County and the Lemhi County Parcels had to be sold at public auction.

6.

Plaintiff never owned the Lemhi County Parcels, consisting

of approximately 80 acres, which is the subject of this dispute.
7.

Plaintiff was never and has never been a licensed real estate

broker in the State ofIdaho.
8.

Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff $1000 per acre for the

Lemhi County Parcels based on the condition that the Plaintiff acquire the Lemhi
County Parcels directly from Lemhi County, which the Plaintiff never did.

9.

The Lemhi County Parcels were always owned by Lemhi

County, a fact neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants understood in April 2005.
10.

The Lemhi County Parcels could never be sold directly to the

Plaintiff and had to be sold at public auction --- a fact, neither the Plaintiff nor the
Defendants understood when they agreed that Defendants would pay the Plaintiff
$1000 an acre for the Lemhi County Parcels.
11.

The Lemhi County Parcels were sold at public auction by

Lemhi County on August 22, 2005.
12.

Defendants sent Scott Karterman to the public auction on

August 22, 2005 to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels on their behalf.

FROM: Cynthia
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Plaintiff and Defendants, through Karterman, orally agreed

that Plaintiff would not bid on the Lemhi County Parcels at auction and that
Kartennan would bid on behalf of the Defendants for the Lemhi County Parcels.
14.

Plaintiff and Defendants never reduced their oral agreement

made at the public auction, that Plaintiff would not bid at the public auction, to
writing.
15.

Defendants acquired the Lemhi County Parcels at public

auction for $35,012.00.
16.

After the public auction, Defendants sent Plaintiff a release

and settlement agreement which was not accepted by the Plaintiff.
17.

This law suit is brought by the Plaintiff asking Defendants to

pay Plaintiff additional monies for the Lemhi County Parcels, which the Plaintiff
never owned. Plaintiff is seeking the difference between what Defendants paid at
public auction ($35,012.00) and the $1000 an acre Defendants allegedly agreed to
pay the Plaintiff ($80,000.00).
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IDIT 6.01.1 - Elements of contract· introductory

INSTRUCTION NO.
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties to do or not do
something that is supported by consideration.
There are four elements to complete a contract Every contract must
have these four elements. The four elements are:

1.

Competent parties;

2.

A lawful purpose;

3.

VaJid consideration; and

4.

Mutual agreement by all parti~s to aU essential terms.

It is not disputed that the following element is present in the contract
alleged by the Plaintiff in this case: (1) that the parties were competent to
contract.

It is disputed wh~ther it was a lawful contract, whether there was valid
consideration and whether there was mutual agreement by the Plaintiff and
Defendants as to the essential terms of the contract.

Ill~/GUU9
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IDJI 6.03.1 - Lawful purpose
INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, Defendants allege that the contract did not have a
lawful purpose for two reasons: (1) Because it is illegal to agree not to
bid at a public auction; and (2) it is illegal for anyone to seek money
regarding the sale of property it does not own unless they are a licensed
Idaho real estate broker. Plaintiff is not and never has been a licensed
Idaho real estate broker.
The purpose for which the contract was made, and the actions or
non-actions expected of the parties in order to perform under the
contract, must all be lawful when the contract was made.

Comment:
Whether a particular purpose is lawful is a question of law for the court. What the
purpose of the contract was is a question of fact for the jury, if disputed.
A fact specific instruction should be given as to which purposes raised in the case
are lawful or unlawful.
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IDJI 6.04.1 - Consideration
INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, Defendants allege that there was no consideration to
support the existence of a contract.
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of
value was given or was agreed to be given in exchange for it. In law, the
giving of value or agreement to give value is caUed "consideration."
Consideration is the benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in
exchange for the other party's performance or promise to perform.
Consideration can be a promise to do something the party is not
required to do, or a promise not to do something the party otherwise
would be free to do.
Consideration must have value; if it has no value at all, it is not
sufficient. If the parties have agreed upon the specific consideration to
be given in this case, then any value, however slight, is sufficient.
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IDR 6.05. I - Agreement on all material terms

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, Defendants allege that Plaintiff and Defendants did
not agree to all the esseutial terms of the alleged contract because both
Plaintiff and Defendants incorrectly assumed that

Plaintiff couId

requirement is sometimes referred to as the "meeting of the minds,"
and means that

an parties to

a contract must have understood and

accepted aU of the essential terms of the contract.
There is no contract unless aD of the essential terms have been
communicated to an parties, understood by an parties, and accepted by

aU parties. The fanare of both Plaintiff and Defendants to understand
that Plaintiff could never acquire the Lemhi County Parcels directly
from Lemhi County Jndicates that the parties did not agree to all the
essential terms of a binding contract and that there is no enforceable
contract. H there is no enforceable contract, then you must find for the
Defendants.
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IDJI 6.05.7 - Mutual mistake
INSTRUCTION NO.

Mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting,
share a misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which
the bargain is based.

Comment;
Hines v. Hines, 129 Id. 847, 853 (1997); Dennet v. Kuenzli, 130 Id. 27 (Ct. App.
1997); Moore v. Mullen, 123 Id. 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1993); Leydet v. City of Mountain
Home, 119 rd. 1041.
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IDlI 6.06.4 - Certain agreements must be in writing

INSTRUCTION NO.
Certain contracts must be in writing to be enforceable, such as
contracts for the purchase and sale of real estate. If such a contract is
not in writing, it simply means that the contract may not be enforced in
court. If you fmd that Plaintiff's claims relate to the enforcement of a
contract for the sale of real property which was not reduced to writing,
you must find for the Defendants.
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IDJI 6.07.2 ~ Unjust enrichment - equitable theories
INSTRUCTION NO.

Even though there is no agreement between the parties, under
certain circumstances where a party has been unjustly enriched by the
actions of another the law will require that party to compensate the
other for the unjust gain. To recover under this theory, the Plaintiff has
the burden of proving each of the following:
1.

The Plaintiff provided a benefit to the Defendants;

2.

The Defendants accepted the benefit; and

3.

Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the

,

Defendants to retain the benefit without compensating the Plaintiff for
its value.

Comment:
For the elements of unjust enrichment, see Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456,567
P.2d 1 (1977); Common Builder. Inc. v. ruce. 126 Idaho 616, 888 P.2d 790 (App. 1995).
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IDJI 6.08.2 - Interpretation of contract - witness's testimony, ambiguity of contract

INSTRUCTION NO.
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the contract
offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties occurring before
execution of the written agreement, which is inconsistent with the plain,
ordinary meaning of the written agreement While you may consider the
testimony of witnesses if necessary to clarify an ambiguity, you may not
consider such testimony to completely change the agreement, or to construe a
term of the agreement in such a fashion that it no longer fits with the other,
non-ambiguous terms or parts.
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IDJ16.08.4 -Interpretation of contract - definition of material fact
INSTRUCTION NO.
A

It

material fact"

is one which constitutes substantially the

consideration of the contract, or without which it would not have been made.

Comments:
Black's Law Dictionary (West Pub; Fifth Ed., 1979)
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IDn 6.08.5 - Interpretation of contract - materiality

INSTRUCTION NO.
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in
determining the party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a
reasonable person would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in
determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) the maker
of the representation knows or has reason to know that the recipient is likely to
regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether or
not a reasonable person would so consider.
Comments:
Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616 (1998) (tort standard, refening to Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Sections 538(2).)
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IDJI 6.10.1 - Breach of bilateral contract - general case - no affinnative defenses
INSTRUCTION NO.
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
1. A contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants;
2. The Defendants breached the contract;
3. The Plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and
4. The amount of the damages.

H you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
of the propositions required of the Plaintiff has been proved, then you
must consider the issue of the afUrmative defenses raised by the
Defendants, and explained in the next instruction. If you fmd from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this
instruction has not been proved, your verdict should be for the
Defendants.
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IDJI 6.10.4 - General contract - affirmative defenses

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case the Defendants have asserted certain affirmative

defenses.

The Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the

affirmative defenses asserted as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a valid cause of
action under Idaho law.

2.

Even assuming there was a lawful contract between Plaintiff and
Defendants (which Defendants dispute), Plaintiff has no right to
enforce tlrls contract because it breached the contract because it never
owned the Lemhi County Parcels it was trying to sell to the Plaintiff.

3.

Even assuming there was a lawful contract between Plaintiff and
Defendants (which Defendants dispute), Plaintiff has no right to
enforce tbls contract because it breached the contract because
Plaintiff was never a licensed Idaho broker and accordingly is not
entitled to collect any monies for the sale of the Lemhi County
Parcels under Idaho law.

4.

Plaintiff has failed to establish any damages because Plaintiff never
owned the Lemhi County Parcels.

5.

Plaintiffwaived its right to collect any monies from the Defendants
because it voluntarily agreed not to bid on the Lemhi County Parcels
at public auction.

. 6.

Plaintiff has failed to plead or establish the existence of an
enforceable contract under Idaho law.
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Plaintiff's contractual claims are unenforceable because of mutual
mistake because both Plaintiff and Defendants mistakenly thought
that Plaintiff could buy the property directly from Lemhi County,
which was untrue.

8.

Plaintiff's clahns are Wlenforceable under the Idaho Statute of Frauds
which requires all contracts regarding the sale of property to be in
writing.

9.
,10.

Plaintiff's claims fail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Plaintiff's claims fail because Plaintiff has already been paid for the
real property it actually owned and sold to the Defendants.

11.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of impossibility of
performance.

12.

Plaintiff's claims are barred because the oral agreement not to bid at
public auction was illegal and tmenforceable.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of

these affirmative defenses has been proved, then your verdict should be for
the Defendants.
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IDn 6.11 - Material breach
INSTRUCTION NO.

A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the
contract.

Comments:
Ervin Const. v. Van Orden, 125 Id. 695, 699 (1993)
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IDJI 6.12 - Reasonable satisfaction requirement
INSTRUcrIONNO.
Where a contract includes a provision requiring performance to the
satisfaction of a party, or similar language, and the level or quafity of
performance is not otherwise spelled out, a party may reject the performance
by the other party, upon groUJ\ds of dissatisfaction, only where a reasonable
person in the same situation would find the performance unsatisfactory.

Comment:
See Cheney v. Jenimitt, 107 Idaho 829 (1984); compare Merideth Corp. v. Design
Lithograph Center, 101 Idaho 391, (1980) where contract required actual personal satisfaction.
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IDll 6.13 - Performance of contract - substantial performance
lNSTRUCfION NO.
When I say that a party must have "substantially performed" the
contract or that "substantial performance" of the contract is required, I mean
that the important and essential benefits caned for by the terms of the contract

have been delivered or performed. A contract may be substantially performed
even though there may have been some deviations or omissions from the
performance caned for by the precise language of the contract
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IDJI 6.14.1 • Time for perfonnance of a contract
INSTRUCTION NO.

Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the law will
imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable time, as is
determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties,
and the nature of the performance required. In such case, it is for the jury to
determine what a reasonable time would be under the circumstances, given all
of the evidence in the case.
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mn 6.22.1 - Equitable estoppel
INSTRUCTION NO.
The Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense of
equitable estoppel. This is a legal term which means the Plaintiff may
be prevented from enforcing a contract or term of contract by reason of
the plaintiff's own conduct
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the Defendants
have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The Plaintiff falsely represented or concealed a material

fact to the Defendants;
2.

The Plaintiff knew or should have known the true facts;

3.

The Defendants did not know and could not discover the

true facts;
4.

The Defendants relied on the misrepresentation or

concealment to the Defendants' prejudice.
Comment:
Willig v. Dept. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261 (1995); Medical Servo
Group v. Boise Lodge,310, 126 Idaho 90, 95 (1994 Ct. App.); Tommerup v. Albertson's,
Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 5-6 (1980); Bjornstad v. Peny, 92 Idaho 402 (1968). Quasi-estoppel;
Quasi estoppel is distinguished from equitable estoppel in that no concealment or
misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the other,
is a necessary ingredient. The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be
unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior
position. Willig v. State D<a>t. of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261 (1995).
Determination of the application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is an equitable issue for
the court to determine, and not a jury issue. The jury may be asked to determine the
existence of predicate facts, but would not be instructed on the application of the
doctrine.
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IDJI 6.22.2 - Waiver by estoppel

INSTRUCTION NO.
The Defendants have raised the defense of waiver by estoppel.
This is a legal term which means that a party is deemed to have waived
a claimed breach of contract by reason of the party's own conduct. To
establish the defense of waiver by estoppel, the Defendants have the
burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The Plaintiff represented to the Defendants [by words or

conduct] [or] [by silence when a duty to speak and protest the action of
the defendant existed] that Plaintiff was waiving, excusing or forgiving
the Defendants' breach of contract; and
2.

The Defendants relied upon this representation and

materially changed position in reliance thereon; and
3.

The reliance was reasonable in light of all of the

circumstances; and
4.

The change of position was to the Defendants' detriment

If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, you

should fmd that the Defendants are not liable to the Plaintiff for the
claimed breach of contract. If the Defendants fail to prove all of the
propositions, the defendant has not established the aiTumative defense
of estoppel.
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IDJI 6.24.1 - Waiver

INSTRUCTION NO.
Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be
evidenced by conduct, by words, or by acquiescence.

Comment:
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (1997)
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IDJI 6.24.2 - Release
lNSTRUCfION NO.
A release is a written declaration by a party that releases a particular
claim or right to pursue a claim against another party. A release may be made
with or without consideration.

Comment:
Restatement of Contracts (Second) §284
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IDn 6.26 - Impossibility as a defense
Caution: Impossibility as a defense will invariably be based upon a specific fact
circumstance. The pattern instruction focuses on the elements of the defense rather than
on any attempt to catalog the circumstances giving rise to it. In the ordinary case, it may
be necessary to include additional instructions addressing the specific circumstances of
the case.
INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, the Defendants have claimed the defense of
impOSSibility because of the fonowing circumstance:

PlaintifJ never

owned the Lemhi County Parcels and never could have acquired the
Lemhi County Parcels from Lemhi County because it was required that
the Lemhi County Parcels be sold at public auction.

In order for this defense to apply, the Defendants have the
burden of proof on each of the following:

1.

The circumstance aUeged by the Defendants exists or

existed through no fault of the Defendants.

2.

The happening of this circumstance could not reasonably

have been anticipated by the Defendants when the contract was entered
into.
3.

The happening of this circumstance was not assigned or

assumed as the responsibility of any party by the contract itself.
4.

The happening of this circumstance prevents the

performance of the contract in its essential and important terms.
H you find from your consideration of aU the evidence in the case
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict
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IDJI 6.27.1- Fraud
INSTRUCTION NO.
To establish the defense of fraud, the Defendants have the
burden proving by clear and convincing evidence each of the following
propositions:
I. The Plaintiff made a representation of a past or present fact;
2. The representation was false;
3. The represented fact was important;
4. The Plaintiff knew the representation was false (or acted with
a reckless disregard of the truth of the representation);
5.

The Defendants were not aware of the falsity of the

representation;
6.

The Plaintiff intended that Defendants rely upon the

representation in agreeing to enter into the contract;
7. The Defendants did rely upon the representation;
8. The Defendants' reliance was justified; and
9. The Defendants has offered to return to the Plaintiff whatever
the Defendants would be legally obligated to return in order to prevent
his being unjustly enriched.

If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case

that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict
should be for the Defendants. If you fmd that any of the propositions
has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff.
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IDJI 6.27.3 - Defense of non-disclosure
INSTRUCTION NO.
A party is not obligated to perform a contract if that party
establishes the defense of nondisclosure. To establish the defense of
non-disclosure, the Defendants have the burden of proving each of the
following propositions by clear and convincing evidence.

1.

The Plaintiff was aware of a fact vital to the essence of the

contract;
2.

The Defendants were unaware of the fact, and eould not

reasonably learn of it;
3.

The Plaintiff knew that the Defendants were unaware of

the true fact and knew that disclosure of the true fact would correct a
basic assumption upon which the defendant was making the contract;
4.

The Plaintiff did not disclose the fact to the Defendants,

intending that the Defendants would act in ignorance of the fact;
5.

The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to

act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair
dealing; [and1
6. The Defendants entered into the contract upon the
reasonable assumption that the non-disclosed fact did not exist; and
7.

Defendants returned or offered to return to the Plaintiff

any benefit received under the contract which the Defendants should
not, in fairness, retain if Defendants are to be relieved from the contract.

7/15/2009 5:25 PM

vROM: Cynthia J Woolley

TO: +1 (208) 8

PAGE: 054 OF 061

H you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence in the case
that each of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict
should be for the Defendants. H you fmd that any of the propositions
has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff.

Corrunent:
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be
superior to the previous IOJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161;
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964).
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SECTION 9.00 - DAMAGES
IDJI 9.00 - Cautionary instruction on damages

INSTRUCTION NO.
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express
any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
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IDJI 9.03 - Damages for breach of contract - general fonnat
INSTRUCTION NO.
If the jury decides the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
Defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonable and fairly compensate the Plaintiff for any of the following
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the
Defendants' breach of contract:
Plaintiff must prove: (1) there was a lawful and binding contract
under Idaho law; (2) that there was consideration given for the
contract; (3) that Plaintiff and Defendants agreed to all the material
terms of the contract; (4) that there was a meeting of the minds and no
mutual mistake regarding the contract; and (5) that Plaintiff suffered
damages by reason of Defendants' actions.
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to
determine.
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IDJI 1.13.1 Alternate form - concluding remarks
INSTRUCTION NO.
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary
that at least three-fourths of the jury agree.

Your verdict must

represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to it.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so
without violence to individual judgment Each of you must decide the
case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do
not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if
convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts.
Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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IDJI 1.15.1 Completion ofyerdict form- general verdict

INSTRUCfION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a
foreman, who will preside over your deliberations.
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any
instructions. Use only the ones conforming to your conclusions and
return the others unused.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or
nine of you. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign

it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so
agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will
notify the bailiff, who will then return you into open court.
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IDJI 1.15.2 - Completion of verdict form on special interrogatories
INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a
foreman, who will preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate form ofverdid will be submitted to you with any

instructions. Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all
of the questions required of you by the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or
nine of you. As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each
of the required questions in the verdict, you should fill it out as
instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine
agree on each question. H your verdict is unanimous, your foreman
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree,
then those so agreeing will sign the verdict
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will
notify the bailiff, who will then retum you into open court.

Comment:
Two fonns are set forth, one for use with a general verdict and one
for use with special interrogatories. There are still some ambiguities, such
as exactly who signs the final verdict when the same jurors do not agree to
each question. However, pattern instructions drafted to fit every
circumstance became too cumbersome. The committee detennined that
the above instruction was sufficient to meet the general case; that if an
ambiguous circumstance arose which the jury could not work out for
themselves, they could request further instructions from the court.
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IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction

INSTRUCTION NO ...,...
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IDJI 1.17 - Post verdict jury instruction

INSTRUCTION NO.
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and
are discharged with the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now
discuss this case 'With the attorneys or with anyone else. For your
guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss
this case, if you want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may
choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to talk to
someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you
like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions.
If anyone persists in discussing the case over you.r objection, or becomes

critical of your service, either before or after any discu.ssion has begun,
you may report it to me.
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IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks
INSTRUCTION NO._
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have
instructed you regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the
evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present
their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room
for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury
deliberations.

Therefore, the attitude and conduct of jurors at the

beginning of the deliberations are important

At the outset of

deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to
vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be
aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if
shown that it is wrong.

Remember that you are not partisans or

advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's views.

Deliberate with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so
without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide
this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your feUow jurors.

